Does Wage Restraint Reduce Manager's Incentive Efficiency?—An Analysis of Model of Pay-structure Based on Catering Theory ---- Based on Compensation Contracts In the Context of Wage Restraint

South China Journal of Economics ›› 2011, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (10) : 38-46.

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South China Journal of Economics ›› 2011, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (10) : 38-46.
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Does Wage Restraint Reduce Manager's Incentive Efficiency?—An Analysis of Model of Pay-structure Based on Catering Theory ---- Based on Compensation Contracts In the Context of Wage Restraint

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{{article.zuoZheEn_L}}. {{article.title_en}}[J]. {{journal.qiKanMingCheng_EN}}, 2011, 29(10): 38-46

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